Abstract-We present the design and evaluation of 14, a network infrastructure that enables information exchange and collaboration among different domains. 14 can help with network management in many scenarios, such as when eliminating the unwanted traffic to improve the network performance as well as diagnosing the network problems. We present the Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attack as an example to demonstrate the advantages of 14. Simulation results show that 14 can significantly reduce the amount of DDoS attack packets and dramatically improve the quality of services received by legitimate users. Our design provides attractive properties, such as incremental deployment as well as incentives for such deployment etc.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the rapid growth of the Internet and applications, the network management becomes a more and more important issue. For example, the traffic on the today's Internet is mixed with the "good" and the "bad" packets, such as Denial-ofService attack packets, Spam, Virus, Worm etc. However with the current Internet infrastructure, all the traffic is simply forwarded by the ISP domains with "best efforts" and the destination domains can only passively receive all the traffic arriving at their links. The bad packets not only waste the resources of their recipients, but also consume the bandwidth inside the ISP domains, which adversely affects the performance of good end-to-end applications. Moreover, while overall still fairly stable, the Internet is fragile to failures due to attacks or human mistakes and it is difficult to recover from failures in a timely and effectively manner. Today only a few end-to-end measurement tools, such as traceroute and ping, and perhaps BGP information are available to help detect and diagnose the network problem, which provides limited and sometimes confusing information. Network management is vital to the success of the next generation Internet.
In this paper, we propose Internet Information Interaction Infrastructure (14) to enable the information exchange among domains. In many scenarios, network management would benefit from additional information from remote domains involved in the network events. The information is interactively and automatically exchanged in 14, which helps the Internet adapt to network dynamics and response to network problems promptly without human involvement. Another benefit is that the inter-domain collaboration is made possible. For Our contributions in this paper are as follows: First we present a generic inter-domain information exchange framework to tackle a large range of challenging problems. Second, we present the detailed design of this infrastructure and demonstrate the effectiveness of information exchange by using DDoS attack as an example. Third, we describe accompanying algorithms and ideas, such as weight-based resource allocation and scheduling, and "received key" based authentication mechanism that might be of independent interests.
Different from the traditional client-server mode, 14 is designed as a peer-to-peer overlay network, where every participating domain can initialize and respond the request. Without the centralized architecture, 14 not only scales well with the size of the Internet, but also is robust against the single-point failure. We design 14 to be practical in the following key aspects. First, 14 strongly incents both ISP domains and customer domains to deploy. Second, 14 supports the incremental deployment that allows the participating domains to have the immediate benefits. Third, we design the information exchange procedure to be efficient and secure against various attacks. This paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the architecture of 14. Section III presents the detailed information interaction procedure in the case of DDoS attacks. Section IV shows that the useful knowledge can be extracted from information exchanged. Section V studies several procedures to throttle the DDoS attack traffic by applying the extracted knowledge and presents the NS-2 simulation results. In the following sections we summarize the advantages of 14, discuss related issues and present a survey of related works.
II. THE ARCHITECTURE OF 14 A. Overview Conceptually, each Autonomous System' (AS) in the Internet supporting 14 has one 14 agent responsible for the task of information interaction in this domain (see Fig. 1 ). Generally speaking, when one agent in the Internet observes a piece of original "information", e.g. one or a sequence of packets, it generates a query regarding this piece of information, and sends this query, usually together with some additional information, to another agent that is responsible for interpreting the query and providing an answer. Finally the agent that sent the query will take actions based on the content of the answer received. This kind of information exchange is termed the "pull" mode; because from the perspective of the initiator, the 'In this paper, "AS" is used exchangeably with "domain". last event in the information exchange procedure2 is to pull the information from the responder. One of the necessary conditions for information exchange is the availability of the responder's identity or location. However, due to asymmetric routing, the customer domain usually has no idea about which ISP domain currently forwards the traffic coming toward itself3. "Pull" mode may be the most suitable way for information exchange in this situation: the ISP domain attaches its location/identity information in the query so that the customer domain knows where to send the answer back.
In other scenarios, the initiator may already know the identity/location of the responder, e.g. via previous information exchange or a service agreement established through some additional channel. If this is the case, the query is not a necessary condition for an answer to be triggered. This kind of information exchange is referred as "push" mode because the initiator pushes the information to the responder. Fig. 2 shows the procedures of both modes. Note that a more complicated "push" mode may require some preliminary communication to fulfill certain prerequisites for the final "push". Fig. 2(b) shows such an example.
To exchange information, query and answer can be either piggybacked in the originally observed data packet or conveyed by an out-of-band message. Different choices result in different tradeoffs between overhead and flexibility. Either way, query and answer are usually carried by unicast IP packets that are routed by Internet standard routing protocol, i.e. BGP.
B. Intra-AS issues
Due to scalability consideration, the function of the 14 agent may be implemented in as few as just one node inside one AS.
2Precisely speaking, all information exchange events are correlated more or less in the long term, and all of them constitute one large procedure that lasts through the lifetime of one agent. In this paper, we abstract a set of temporally and content correlated events as one information exchange procedure. 3Instead, the ISP domain can implicitly infer how to reach the agent in the customer domain from the destination IP address in the packets forwarded. In order to exert its capability, the 14 agent has to collaborate with other entities, such as IDS/IPS and routers. The necessary network and intra-domain routing configurations must be set up in advance in order for them to communicate with each other. Moreover, the security association between 14 agent and other entities is established and the time-synchronization is maintained. These requirements are reasonable because they are under the same administration domain.
A router plays an important role in the information exchange. First, it selects some data packets based on certain criteria and forwards them to the 14 agent so that a query can be generated. Second, query and answer are forwarded by routers to the corresponding 14 agents based on their Forwarding Information Bases (FIBs). In addition, during the transmission a router in the 14 domain checks whether an incoming query or answer should be processed in this domain; if so, the router forwards it to the local 14 agent. Third, after an 14 agent receives the answer and decides the actions to take, it communicates with routers where the decisions will take effect. Fig. 3 shows such interactions between routers and an 14 agent.
It is also possible, especially in one large AS, that there are multiple 14 agents set up for the purpose of faulttolerance, load-balancing, etc. In order to achieve scalability when enabling the inter-agent communication, these path. This improves the security of one-es because otherwise the attacker could send t from anywhere without being detected.
3) Multi-path based authentication: In t "pull" mode and three-way "push" mode the one-way "push" mode because the add implicitly ensure that the answer is from the receives the query before. However both ai to Man-in-Middle attacks. To address this i: leverages on the availability of multiple AS As shown in Fig. 4 , AS 4 receives two AS-paths to AS H(H(H(KO,1),4),5) 0 and two received keys, Kro,4 and Kr-,4.
We assume that ---C--J AS 4 is the initiator and AS 0 is the responder. In the "pull" 0,2),3), 4) Ko, 1), 4) associAlthough the information exchange is still vulnerable to the icludes the current dropping attack, the proposed mechanism makes it difficult for -ode (MAC) gen-the on-path attacker to impersonate another domain. Furtherntent of answer 1 more, it only requires a small extension to BGP message; as swer, it generates MAC is attached to the query and the answer, no additional then reconstructs secure exchange is needed.
AC. AS 0 accepts
The way we distribute the received key is similar with therwise drops it Listen&Whisper [18] . However, it is for different purposes.
Listen&Whisper focuses on verifying the integrity of different iat the initiator is AS paths while we try to utilize the availability of multiple AS n the answer. An paths for security protection of inter-domain communication. DDoS attacks are deemed as the first-order threat in the Internet. The infamous attack in February 2000 caused major Internet portals such as Yahoo, eBay and E*Trade to shut down. Despite the lack of media attention after that, DDoS attacks are even more severe and prevalent in the Internet. Today the binary codes or even the complete packages of DDoS attack tools are readily available and do not require sophisticated knowledge to launch. In a previous paper [13] , the authors reported a surprisingly huge number of DDoS attacks observed in everyday traffic.
We apply the "pull" information exchange mode in the case of DDoS attack. We call the agent in the ISP domain "query agent" and the agent in the customer domain (i.e. the target of attackers) "answer agent". As shown in Fig. 1 , the information exchange procedure can be formulated as a feedback model: the query is a signal to the customer domain while the answer serves as a feedback to the ISP domain; after several times of exchanges, this feedback mechanism would make the whole system converge to an equilibrium state. In the following we present detailed packet formats and information interaction procedures.
B. Query 1) Query generation: To generate a query, routers in the ISP domain randomly select a data packet with a certain probability, Pr, and forwards this selected packet4 to the query agent. We propose to piggyback the query in the selected data packet because an out-of-band query message results in more overheads. It may cause the fragmentation if Maximum Transmission Unit (MTU) is exceeded. If attackers use small packets, such as in SYN flooding attack, the probability that 14 would cause the fragmentation is small. If large packets are used in attacks, with a large probability there is at least one query piggybacked in the first fragmentation if any; thus once an attack fragmentation is identified, the whole packet does not have to be re-assembled. The fragmentation issue is related with many factors, such as characteristics of network links, the deployment of 14 and the attacker's strategies.
We propose a new type of IP protocol, called "query", which is placed in the protocol field in the original IP header. The query starts with a generic header where the next header field indicates the type of next header, either an upper transport protocol or another query. Each payload follows the TypeLength-Value (TLV) format as some payloads are optional or of variable size.
The value of Pr should be carefully chosen in order to strike a balance between the overhead of IP packet processing and the amount of information exchanged. Furthermore, a router could select the data packet from different aggregates5 [11] with different probabilities, thus it can spend more resources for some aggregates of special interests, e.g. those destined for one preferred customer domain whose intention of reception is distributed proactively or reactively [5] .
2) Query payloads: Table I lists the descriptions and the suggested lengths of payloads appearing in the query. Note that in practice, there may be more efficient way to represent these payloads. We briefly discuss below the use of these payloads. (See section IV for more details.)
. "Router ID" and "Interface ID": The administrator can assign unique numbers to routers and their interfaces.
4Additional information, such as the IP address or the identity of the router, the interface where this selected data packet arrives or departs, and the local time, may be forwarded to the query agent as well.
5The traffic can be separated into aggregates based on the interfaces that the packets arrive at or depart from, destination IP address or prefix, or the output of some clustering algorithm. These two payloads identify the origin of the information (either a query or answer) received by an 14 agent. Also later a query agent can know where the corresponding knowledge should be distributed. . "Timestamp": It allows a query agent to learn the temporal property of the information received. This payload together with "Router id" and "Interface id" is provided by routers to the query agent. . "Sequence number": To resist the replay attack, this payload contains the current value of a counter incremented by one when a query is sent. . "Cookie": It allows the query agent to statelessly verify that the received answer is indeed in response to a query generated by itself earlier. This payload contains the output of the following formula:
H(K, Query agent 1 destIP other payloads) (1) where K is the secret key generated by the query agent and H is a secure hash function. In the case of a DDoS attack, the query is like a question to the answer agent: Is this selected data packet good or bad?
3) Query transmission: As the destination IP address is not changed, the query is forwarded to the same destination domain as the original data packet selected. Fig. 5 shows the procedure of query transmission. A generates a query, QA,C, to C. If there is an 14 domain, say, B on the route from A to C, it treats this received query just like a selected data packet: B first encrypts QA,C (except the generic header) with its secret key, KB, and then inserts its own query QB,C in between the IP header and QA,C. Note that the cookie payload in QB,C also covers the encrypted portion of QA,C. Finally this query will arrive at the destination domain C. a bad packet, 100% as a bad packet data payload, thus the query agent could install some filters based on the received signature in the appropriate routers. "Duration": This indicates the validity period of a provided signature. Note that the query agent may independently set up the lifetime for the received signature rather than based on this payload. 3) Answer message transmission: Fig. 5 shows the procedure of answer message transmission. When B receives an answer message from C, it first checks if this is a replayed message by examining the "Sequence number" payload, SB, just like the anti-replay window mechanism in IPSec. Then B reconstructs the cookie based on Equation 1 with IP addresses and related payloads as inputs. Note that the order of the source IP address and the destination IP address in the received answer message should be reversed when calculating the cookie. B accepts this answer message if the output matches with the "Cookie" payload, CB, received or simply discards it otherwise. After the validation, B may update its knowledge and take further actions based on the received information.
Furthermore, B decrypts the first encrypted query, QA,C in -this example and constructs an answer message for A based on, e.g. the "Content" payload and the "answer" payload, generated by C. When A receives AC,A from B, it follows the same procedure to verify the received answer message and takes the information into consideration if succeed.
D. Discussion
Our information exchange protocol is efficient and lightweight because it does not maintain the connection-oriented states like in TCP. "Cookie" payload enables the query agent to statelessly verify the received answer message. It is computationally impossible for an attacker to forge a valid cookie without the knowledge of the secret key, K. Although it is still vulnerable to Man-in-Middle attack, it does not introduce any new threat. See section VII for more discussion on security issues.
Query and answer may be lost or reordered during the transmission. With the anti-replay sliding window and the stateless verification, our protocol is robust against packet reordering. Moreover, "Timestamp" payload allows the query agent to apply the received information properly, especially when an answer experiences the long transmission delay. Finally as we will show in section IV, adaptive sampling can tolerate 14 packet loss. 
where Rcurrent =-, t is the inter-packet interval, k is a constant, e.g. k = 2 and I is the average length of data packets. Moreover, with "Query agent", "Router ID" and "Interface ID" payloads in the received query, the customer domain C can estimate the arrival rate of aggregates forwarded by one remote ISP domain, B, because each query is a randomly selected sample of the traffic. For example, if within T seconds the number of queries that C receives from B is NQ,B and the probability of query generation is Pr, the rate of the aggregate (B, O,O, C) isPrQT packets per second.
2) The percentage of bad packets: C can further estimate the percentage of bad packets, denoted by Pc, of the aggregates forwarded by B. For example, assume within T seconds the number of queries from B received by C is NQ -1 and C generates the answers {Ao,... ,ANQ1}. Recall that Ai, 0 < i < NQ -1, contains the probability that a selected data packet is bad. Then Pc of the aggregate (B, 0, 0, C) during this time period is estimated as IAI where 0 < i < NQ- 1 a basic approach to estimate the percentage of bad packets. Fig. 6 gives a simple result of implementing a "sample and hold" strategy which is nothing but a zero-order interpolation. From this figure we can see that when the probability of query generation becomes smaller, the error in estimation becomes bigger. However even when Pr = 0.005, the estimation is still close to the real data. We will apply these parameters in the simulation of rate-limiting DDoS attack traffic in section V.
In the future, we propose to study this issue further in depth. For example, two questions that need to be answered are: 1) how to adapt to the traffic dynamics and adjust the corresponding parameters to provide an accurate estimation? 2) how to apply the estimated percentage to the current incoming traffic and promptly adapt to any rapid change?
To address the first question, we intend to apply an adaptive sampling method where the sampling frequency depends on the dynamic properties of the variables being sampled. To address the second question, we can analyze the trend from the last m measured percentages, then estimate Pc in the near future, for example, by Linear Mean Square Estimation (LMSE) and ARMA. It is also useful to evaluate these approaches with real DDoS attack traces from real networks.
V. EXAMPLES OF COLLABORATIVE DEFENSE AGAINST
DDoS ATTACKS 14 is capable to address any kind of unwanted traffic. If a "signature" is available, such as existing TCP sessions, nonspoofing packet flooding and worm traffic, a filter based on the answer message can be installed in the upstream domain. With the knowledge described in section IV, 14 is even more powerful in that it can address more challenging attacks, such as spoofing attack8 and initial requests flooding [16] . In this section, we assume a general form of the DDoS attack where a "signature" is not available.
Our observation is that during a DDoS attack, bad traffic contends limited resources, such as the packet scheduling, the link bandwidth etc, with the good traffic. However, currently the router cannot distinguish the "good" from the "bad". 14 precisely addresses this limitation. In the following we show how knowledge learned from information exchanged would help mitigate the effects of DDoS attacks. A. Differentiated server load balancing mechanism Reference [10] proposed that during the DDoS attack a server (the victim) indicates the load it desires to specific upstream routers, then routers drop the excess traffic to the server. For example, assume that there are n upstream domains, {Do, D1, ..., D-1 }, forwarding the traffic to one victim domain, V. V splits its total server load, S, into {So Si, ..., S-} and then indicates this information to the corresponding upstream domains, Di. However in [10] V does not split its server load optimally. As we described above, with the information exchange the victim domain can now estimate the volume of traffic forwarded by each upstream domain Di and which upstream domain forwards the "better" traffic in terms of the percentage of bad packets within. Thus V can assign the larger workloads to those Di forwarding a lower percentage of bad packets, which makes the victim domain not only receive the appropriate amount of traffic without exceeding its capacity, but also serve more "good" packets from the legitimate users.
B. Weighted queue scheduling mechanism
In this section we propose a weighted queue scheduling mechanism that schedules packet forwarding from one incoming queue to one outgoing queue based on the weight assigned to the incoming queue. .. = Pk. Thus the weighted queue scheduling mechanism is better than or as good as the "Round Robin" mechanism in terms of the overall percentage of bad packets forwarded. By assigning a higher weight to the queue containing a lower percentage of bad packets, the router in the ISP domain spends more resources in forwarding the packets from these "good" queues. Thus the queue with the higher percentage of bad packets tends to become full and eventually more bad packets are dropped.
2) Discussion: The proposed mechanism is based on the preferential scheduling of the shared resources among interfaces. Although the modern "carrier-class" router starts to have more CPU or memory for each linecard, or without full-mesh cross-bar. As it is these slower routers that are more likely congested during the DDoS attack, this proposed mechanism could significantly improve the performance of good sessions if implemented in these bottlenecks.
C. Weighted aggregate-scheduling mechanism
We propose another scheduling mechanism based on the weight of aggregates inside each queue. 1) Overview: Assume that there are n aggregates in one unidirectional queue, Q, {Ao, A1, ..., An-1 }. The arrival rate of Ai is Ri pkt/sec or Bi Mb/sec, thus the total arrival rate of all aggregates is RBi Mb/sec. Also we assume that the probability to generate an 14 query from the packets arriving at Q is P and the bandwidth of Q is B Mb/sec. When the queue is congested, the router starts to rate-limit the incoming traffic in this queue. The total of excess traffic to be dropped is Bi-c * B where c is a constant factor. Fig. 7 shows the procedure of processing an incoming packet in 14 queue during the congestion. The router checks whether this packet belongs to an aggregate to be rate-limited. If yes, the packet is forwarded to a rate-limiter module that determines whether this packet should be dropped. If not, the packet is forwarded to a query generation module that generates a query based on this packet with the probability P.
2) Rate-limiting algorithms: Algorithm 1 shows the pseudo code of greedy rate-limiting algorithm implemented in our simulation.
Algorithm 1 Greedy rate-limiting algorithm
Sort the aggregates in the descending order of the percentage of bad packets, for exmaple, {A1o, Ai, .., Ai, }. j <= 0, E~Z SoRK -B where Ri, is the arrival rate of Ai and B is the link bandwidth.
Given an incoming packet, pkt, for each aggregate, Aij, if pkt C Aij pkt is dropped with the probability, min{EIRij, I}, and exit the loop.
else if Rij > E, then pkt is forwarded and exit the loop.
else E <= E-Aij, j c= j + 1
The time complexity of Algorithm 1 is O(n) where n is the number of aggregates. Other rate-limiting algorithms, such as token-bucket rate-limiting algorithm [11] and weighted rate-limiting algorithm as described in section V-B, are also possible. Compared with ACC/Pushback [11] , our proposal has more advantages: 1) the high-bandwidth aggregate may not be attack traffic always; 2) with the information learned from the real recipient, the router has a better way to aggregate the flows together and drops more from bad aggregates.
3) Aggregation: To make the rate-limiting more effective, it is better to consider the aggregates with the similar percentage of bad packets together. This may need to combine or separate aggregates dynamically. Moreover, it may be more costeffective to consider the aggregation of small aggregates as a whole. An alternative is to ignore the small aggregate for now and consider it later at some downstream domains when it has converged to a big enough aggregate. We plan to study more about dynamic aggregation and the impacts of these two different strategies on small aggregates in the future. 4) Simulation: In the topology shown in Fig. 8 D. Universal 14 is a universal architecture that can help tackle a large range of problems. For example, during worm outbreak, the capability of intrusion and anomaly detection in one customer domain can discover the worm signature. With 14, this knowledge can be further distributed to other domains; thus the spread of worm can be stopped much faster than before. Also the victim domain could generate the signature of DDoS attack traffic if possible and distribute this knowledge to its upstream domain to throttle the attack. Even when the signature is not available, as shown in section IV, with the information of just one packet accumulated together, i.e. whether this packet received by the victim is "good" or "bad", the ISP domain can preferentially drop attack packets and thus save more good packets.
14 can also help with the network diagnosis. The ISP domain can provide the information, such as the link condition, the statistic of flows, the root-cause of network failure, to the customer domain so that the customer domain can recover from the diaster or leverage this information to improve the end-to-end performance, such as by multi-path routing, source routing etc.
VII. DISCUSSION

A. Security analysis
The attacker may try to evade, disable or even attack 14. In the following, we discuss related threats and countermeasures.
1) Man-in-middle attack: To eavesdrop, modify, intercept and even drop the 14 packet, the attacker must attach to the same routing paths taken by these packets. This prerequisite raises the bar to launch this kind of attack and also limits the scope of potential attackers to be at certain locations. The communicating peers can establish the security association (SA) to protect the confidentiality and integrity of information exchanged based on multiple available AS paths even without security architecture. Note that even with a SA, a man in the middle can still drop the 14 packet. Other methods, such as "WATCHER" [17] , can be used to detect disruptive routers.
2) Query flooding attack: The attacker may try to flood the customer domain with forged queries. If the attacker is inside an 14 domain, the security association between the border router and the 14 agent can detect the forged 14 packet. If an attacker is inside a regular domain or an 14 domain is compromised, the query flood can be injected into the Internet. This issue can be addressed by rate-limiting the queries at border routers. For example, for a certain aggregate, if the ratio between the number of queries and the number of data packets is significantly larger than a threshold (e.g. the query generation probability), the extra queries will be dropped. Query flooding attack is just another form of DoS attack; thus the more forged queries, the higher percentage of bad packets. If the queries are dropped randomly, the percentage of bad packets is not changed. Also the impacts on the percentage estimation should be minimal as a certain amount of queries are still kept. Another approach is to identify the domains where excess queries come from, e.g. based on the information of multiple AS paths carried in the query, and then inform other benign 14 domains to block 14 packets from those domains. This would further motivate the local investigation.
3) Answer flooding attack: The attackers may try to overwhelm the ISP domains by flooding with answer messages. As the forged answer messages do not contain the valid cookies generated by a sequence of 14 domains, they will be dropped when arriving at the first 14 domain, which significantly saves the network bandwidth. 4) Dishonest domain: A greedy/malicious customer domain may try to achieve more benefits by providing wrong answers. For example, it may identify an "attack" packet as "good" intentionally so that the probability for its aggregate to be dropped is smaller. However it ends up with receiving more unwanted packets, which wastes its resources and adversely affects the performance of its legitimate users. Furthermore, in order to incent an honest answer, the ISP domain can provide differentiated services to aggregates. For example, the aggregate containing a higher percentage of bad packets is assigned a larger probability of query generation. Thus the percentage estimation is more accurate and the changes can be detected more quickly. Note that the total number of queries generated is still kept the same. Thus the incentive to provide an honest answer is increased. In the future we plan to apply game theory to analyze the interaction of different answer strategies.
5) Anonymity and privacy: Last but not least, our information exchange procedure provides anonymity and recoverable privacy, as the identity of original 14 domain could be encrypted during the transmission. This would further increase the incentive of participation, especially when the ISP domain may concern that the information provided becomes the evidence against itself later.
B. Availability of I4 under stress
The availability of 14 service is important to resist unwanted traffic in the Internet. If there is more unwanted traffic, the 14 agent more likely generates an effective query, which in return helps remove the unwanted traffic. In other words, 14 is selfreinforcing and self-protecting. Also a step-by-step approach is possible: Firstly, the victim domain informs the upstream domain of the acceptable amount of traffic when a severe DDoS attack is detected, as in [10] ; then after the upstream domains stop forwarding the excess traffic, the victim domain provides more answer messages to help the upstream 14 domain drop more bad packets. We plan to conduct further experiments in the test bed to evaluate these ideas.
C. Overhead
As more memory and CPU cycles are needed, 14 can slow down the packet forwarding. We implemented 14 by using libipq in Linux and ran it on a desktop PC with a P4 2.0GHz CPU and 256M RAM. On the average, 14 adds 0.2ms delay for each data packet during congestion. Although our implementation is not optimal and Linux is not the ideal OS for commercial routers, the result on the off-shelf hardware seems encouraging. We argue that by upgrading the hardware and optimizing router's architecture and 14 design, it is feasible to deploy 14 in the future Internet.
VIII. RELATED WORKS
Our work leverages on many previous works in the literature. Due to the limitation of space, we focus on the DDoS related works.
Early works in this field primarily target at the spoofing DDoS attack. Ingress filtering [12] prevents this attack by checking whether the source IP address falls into the network prefix of an edge domain. However there is no strong incentive of deployment because 1) the effectiveness of such mechanisms depends on universal deployment; 2) the attacker is able to evade this mechanisms with just minor efforts. iTrace/traceback [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] is proposed to traceback the true origin of spoofed packets by providing additional (path) information to the victim. Despite a significant step, it fails to consider the incentives of deployment: the information provided to victims cannot help stop the unwanted traffic remotely injected into the Internet. Given that the legal actions may take a long time to start, ISPs and victims do not see the immediate benefits to justify the cost of deploying iTrace/traceback. References [7] and [15] proposed to help filter the spoofed packet based on either the embedded path information or "hop count" at the edge of domains. However, the attack traffic cannot be dropped early. ACC/Pushback [11] proposed to rate-limit the high-volume aggregates during link congestion and to further push such information back to upstream routers. In [10] , a server under stress installs router throttles in the upstream routers so that excess traffic is dropped before arriving. However neither can distinguish the legitimate traffic from the attack traffic. 14 can be combined with them to drop more attack packets.
SIFF [8] and TVA [16] proposed an end-host capability control mechanism that allows an end host to selectively drop the unwanted packets. Our proposal is similar with this concept; also 14 can address DoS attacks in any kind of traffic, such as unidirectional traffic and many other problems, such as network diagnosis. Furthermore, our mechanism can be combined with "fair-queuing" in TVA to achieve both fairness and prioritization. For example, we can reserve some bandwidth for each flow and allocate the rest based on priorities.
There are a lot of works on analyzing and detecting the DDoS traffic based on statistical methods, such as [6] [14] . Reference [13] reports the DoS attack prevalence and dynamics in the Internet. These works greatly help us understand the DDoS attack.
IX. CONCLUSIONS
We have presented the design of 14, a network infrastructure of information interaction in the Internet. We start with the discussion of general 14 architecture and then demonstrate its advantages by using DDoS attack as an example. In this case, the customer domain expresses its preferences about the current flows to the ISP domain so that the unwanted traffic can be dropped early. Our simulation results and theoretical analyses show that the performance can be greatly improved with the information exchanged.
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